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Financial market crises translate in limited access to credit with negative consequences for all 
producers including those in agriculture. We study how the 2008 crisis affected agricultural 
producers’ access to credit. Agricultural banks were less affected because they are small 
compared to non-agricultural banks and since previous financial crises have affected agricultural 
lenders significantly, this time they were in a better position to manage risks (Briggeman, 
Gunderson and Gloy, 2009; Ellinger, 2009). However, while agricultural sector profitability 
picked in 2008, it has decreased since. Consequently, while the share of problem loans in 
agricultural lenders remain less than 50% of that in non-agricultural banks, delinquencies have 
been increasing (Briggemann, 2011; Ellinger 2011). Increased delinquency rates typically lead to 
elevated collateral requirements with a potential to worsen access to credit for agricultural 
producers, especially among more vulnerable groups (Briggeman and Zakrzewicz, 2009).  
This paper sets out to determine the impact of the financial crisis on access to credit for 
new farming operations and to determine which farmers got credit in the post crisis environment. 
The existence and magnitude of credit constraints for agricultural producers are non-negligible. 
Nationwide, Briggeman, Towe, and Morehart (2009) estimate that the value of production is 3% 
lower in credit-constrained farm sole proprietorships compared to those that are not credit-
constrained. Credit constraints have also been found in agricultural cooperatives and shown to 
affect land values (Chaddad, Cook and Heckelei, 2005; Mishra et al., 2008)  
If the financial crisis has affected farmers’ ability to borrow, then new operations should 
be most affected, since they typically lack capital, experience, or both. Previous studies have 
found that new operations are financially constrained, and that in younger (and high debt) farms, 
the financial constraints are affected by the business cycle (Barry, Bierlen, and Sotomayor, 2000; 
Bierlen and Featherstone, 1998). This group is most vulnerable because banks elevate collateral 3 
 
requirement when delinquencies are on the rise and new farmers typically have less assets to 
offer as collateral. Moreover, even when lenders make lending decisions based on not on 
collateral but on projected performance, younger farmers are still at a disadvantage because they 
have lower return on assets compared to more established operations (Mishra et al., 2009).   
Even prior to the financial crisis, farmers in Alabama, especially small sole proprietors, 
were financially constrained and used off farm spousal income to invest on the farm (Hartarska 
and Mai, 2008). In this paper, we use survey data collected in the fall of 2010 from new 
operations in Alabama to study the degree to which new operations were financially constrained 
during the post crisis period and to identify the factors affecting lending in the 2009-2010 period.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the conceptual 
framework and empirical specifications. Section 3 briefly describes the data. Section 4 
summarizes the results. Conclusions are offered in Section 5.  
 
2. Analytical framework and empirical specifications 
The analysis consists of first establishing if new operators have financing (or liquidity) 
constraints and whether these constraints have become more severe in the post crisis period. 
Next, we identify the factors affecting farmers’ ability to obtain credit, in order to gain insights 
into possible ways to alleviate existing financing constraints.  
The first part of the analysis is based on the literature on asymmetric information in credit 
markets. According to this literature, in the presence of high transaction costs and asymmetric 
information, loans are either rationed or available at a premium (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; 
Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). In such circumstances, external and internal finance are no longer 
substitutes and investment in firms facing high information costs, such as most new farming 4 
 
operators, is constrained by the availability of internal funds (Myers and Majluf, 1984). Since 
financial constraints do not affect all farmers uniformly, the extent of effective financing 
constraints that different operators face provides information on the ability of the financial 
system to cater to their financial needs in that time period.  
Financial constraints are important in farming because farming is capital intensive and 
while farmers do not like debt, many especially newer operations, have limited ability to 
undertake profitable investment with only own funds. The lack of equity markets and seasonality 
of cash flows makes access to loans crucial and the ability of credit markets to alleviate financing 
constraints very important. Moreover, limited diversification opportunity and supply shocks lead 
to large variations in farmers’ net worth and profitability further restricting their investment.   
The financing constraints approach, pioneered by Fazzari et al. (1988), tests for 
differences in sensitivity of investment to internal funds in firms with different levels of 
informational opacity by comparing sub-samples, defined according to priors that characterize 
constrained and unconstrained firms (e.g., new and established farms). For each sub-sample, a 
reduced-form investment equation is estimated where investment is modeled as a function of 
internal funds and investment opportunities determined from a variety of theoretical perspectives 
(Hubbard, 1998).
i A statistically significant difference in investment sensitivity to internal funds 
between sub-samples indicates that one group is more credit constrained. Recently, Carreira and 
Silva (2010) provided an extensive review of the vast empirical literature on the subject. In 
particular, they argue that numerous studies find that younger firms are more financially 
constrained than established firms.  
We first estimate a reduced-form investment equation for the 2008-2010 period for two 
groups of Alabama operators:  new (started any part of their operation between 2000 and 2004) 5 
 
and newest (since 2005) and test for the difference in sensitivity of investment to cash flows. In 
this framework, we also test for differences in financing constraints before and after the crisis of 
2008 for each group. Following Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2008), investment is modeled as a 
function of operators’ investment opportunity and internally generated funds (typically defined 
as revenues minus expenses) to which we add change in liquidity since 2008 and controls.
ii The 
estimated model is of the form: 
∆ Investmenti = β0 + β1Inv Opportunity i + β2 Cash Flowi + β3Change in Liquidity since 2008i + 
 + ΣβKControls i+ ei       (1) 
where ∆ Investment is the percentage change in the value of Fixed Assets, Inv Opportunity is a 
measure of investment opportunity proxied by the change in ROA, Cash Flow is the cash flow 
measure that proxies for available internal cash (liquidity), Change in Liquidity since 2008 is a 
dummy that measures the impact of the 2008 crisis on liquidity and takes the value of one if, 
after 2008, operators kept larger proportion of liquid assets, compared to before 2008.
iii  
In this class of models, proper measurement of the investment opportunities and cash 
flow is important. Farm operators who do not have investment opportunities would not invest 
even if they had cash. These two effects must be clearly separated to ensure that the Cash Flow 
variable (liquidity, net worth) is capturing internally generated funds and not investment 
opportunity to avoid attributing investment’s sensitivity to cash flow.
iv 
The control variables capture various entrepreneurial and operation characteristics and 
may affect farmers’ investment since empirical evidence shows that farmers’ off-farm 
investment is affected by such factors and since money is fungible within the household (Mishra 
and Morehart, 2001). We include controls for entrepreneurial experience and experience in 
farming prior to starting this operation; whether the operator or the spouse work off farm to 6 
 
capture possible access to external funds; the age of the operation to capture experience, and 
gender of the entrepreneur to capture differences in preferences for investment.  We also include 
the proportion of income coming from farming to control for hobby farming as well as the 
proportion of sales coming from various types of farming e.g. livestock (largest group and 
serving as the base), poultry, specialty crops, government payments, and others.  
Investment in farms differs from that in firms because, for farmers who own their land, it 
is the largest part of fixed investments. Some operators may not be landowners, and landowners 
may not be working on their farms. The dependent variable measuring change in fixed assets 
may contain possible measurement error since the survey did not collect data on land ownership 
and increase (or decrease) in land value may drive changes in fixed assets. Furthermore, when 
farmers cannot obtain a loan to invest in fixed assets, they can lease it, and there will be no  
change in investment but we argue that even if this is true it will be systematic (y measurement 
error), and remaining investment cash flow sensitivity remains informative. We also note that the 
majority of farm operators in Alabama are in livestock production (cow and calf) or poultry (66 
% of all farm sales), and land is less important capital asset compared to land in raw-crop 
producing regions. To attenuate this problem, we add the value of farm assets at the beginning of 
the operation, the type of farm operation, and the average county per acre price of land. During 
the study period, there were no recorded drops in the price of agricultural land values, so possible 
bias is likely one-sided. Since the possible measurement error is in the left hand side variable, it 
will be swept away in the error term.   
Since we find that the newest operations face financing constrains, we next want to know 
which farmers were able to overcome these constraints and secure loans. To answer this 
question, we estimate a probit model of who got credit and who was rejected. Some operators, 7 
 
however, may have self-selected out of the market because they believed they would not be 
approved even if they applied for credit. Thus, we estimate a Heckman type probit model to 
control for farmers’ self-selection following Van de Ven and Van Pragg (1981). Specifically, the 
unobserved relationship is  
y
*
j = xjβ + u1j 
where yj
* is the credit received by operators and x includes variables affecting banks’ decisions 
to lend. However, instead of y
*
j , we only observe a binary outcome (received or did not receive 





 However, the dependent variable for operator j is observed only if we observe a loan application 
from that operator. Thus, the selection equation (applying not applying for a loan) is 
yj 
select= zjγ+ u2j > 0 
where 
u1 ~  N(0; 1) 
u2 ~ N(0; 1) 
corr(u1; u2) = ρ 
and the Log likelihood for this model is  
LnL=∑            ,   ,     ∈ 
    
  ∑             ,   ,      ∈ 
    
  ∑      1      
Φ     ,     
 
where S is the set of observations for which yj is observed, Φ  .  is the cumulative bivariate 
normal distribution function (with mean [ 0 0 ]`0), Φ .  is the standard cumulative normal, and 
wj is an optional weight for observation j. 
v 8 
 
To achieve identification, we need at least one instrument in zj that does not also belong 
to x, otherwise identification can be achieved only by functional form. The instrument needs to 
affect the choice to apply or not to apply for credit but not lenders’ decisions to lend. We use two 
instruments:  z1, the perceived lack of access to credit from banks and financial institutions, and 
z2, the perceived lack of access to credit from the Farm Credit System.  
The explanatory variables in the second stage include factors affecting the decision to 
extend a loan by a lender. This decision is based on evaluation of project profitability, collateral, 
and borrower credit worthiness. Since agricultural lending remains collateral driven, the 
existence and value of collateral will be the main determinant on who gets a credit or not.  
Lenders do not have perfect knowledge of the project’s quality and the borrower’s 
credibility. To decrease information asymmetry, lenders collect additional information about 
borrowers and their projects and require collateral to guard against default. Boucher, Carter and 
Guirkinger, (2008) show that asymmetric information can result not only in typical quantity 
rationing but also in "risk rationing" whereby farmers are able to borrow but only under high-
collateral contracts which bring then lower expected well-being. Therefore, farmers’ perception 
of the collateral requirement will affect their application decision. We asked operators if they 
considered availability of collateral as an obstacle to obtaining loans and use this variable in the 
credit equation.  
To control for possible land price effects, we include county level land values. We also 
include farm age to control for availability and quality of financial statements and a growth 
dummy to proxy for farm profitability, since agricultural lenders are increasingly using cash flow 
rather than collateral based lending (Klinefelter and Penson, 2005). We also control for 
operators’ income diversification and creditworthiness by including the percentage of income 9 
 
coming from farming and whether the operator works off the farm since banks also use such 
information in lending decisions (Berger and Udell, 1998).  
To properly identify the effect of credit constraints on investment, variables that affect 
credit but not investment should be included in the credit offer equation. This variable takes the 
value of one if the enterprise grew (experienced employment growth) and zero otherwise. The 
assumption is that change in ROA used in the investment equation captures (expected in 
previous period) investment opportunities, while the dummy variable used in the credit offer 
equation provides information only on whether growing firms were funded or not.  
 
3. The data 
The data come from a survey of new farmers in Alabama, conducted by Alabama National 
Agricultural Statistical Service (NASS) in October 2010.  The survey was designed to collect 
unique financial, business and demographic information from new operators in the state. 
vi 
New operators were defined as farmers in Alabama who begun any part of their operation 
since 2005 based on their answer to the 2007 Agricultural Census.  Questionnaires we sent to all 
farmers of the population and one reminder letter and a questionnaire copy were sent two weeks 
after the first questionnaire.
 vii There were 393 returned questionnaires – a response rate of 24 
percent. 
While only operators who began to operate any part of their operation in 2005 or later 
were part of the population that received the questionnaires, when the completed questionnaires 
were returned, about 30 percent of the respondents indicated that they started their operation 
before 2005. About 90 percent of these operators indicated that they started their operation in a 
year after 2000. Thus, these operators fit the definition for new farmers by The Farm Credit 10 
 
Administration. We use this data feature to our advantage to study if there are financing 
constraints for the two groups of new farmers. The “newest” operators group includes those who 
started their operation in 2005 or later, and the “new” operator group includes those operators 
who, in the survey, indicated that they started any part of their operation between 2000 and 2004. 
The resulting sample with all variables needed for the analysis consists of 305 observations.    
Investment, measured by the change in the value of fixed assets, has both positive 
(investment) and negative (disinvestment) values. The question we use to construct this variable 
first defines fixed assets as land, buildings, machinery vehicles, equipment and breeding 
livestock, and then asks by what percent has the net value of all fixed capital assets changed from 
2008 to 2010 to measure the value of investment as percentage of fixed assets.  
Since land is part of fixed investment, there is a concern that measured increases in 
investment may be due to change in land prices even if there was no real investment change. To 
alleviate measurement errors as discussed in the methods section, we include the county level 
price of land from the 2007 Census of Agriculture to reflect possible differences in the value of 
the assets. Second, we add the value of assets at the beginning of operation to control for size of 
beginning assets values. This variable also corrects for the overall scale effects. Since the largest 
group of farmers in Alabama consists of livestock (calf and cow) and poultry producers, 
ownership of land would cause some measurement error but, for Alabama, the measurement 
error is likely smaller compared to what it may be for a major crop producing region. Further, 
since potential measurement errors are in the dependent variable, we expect valid coefficient 
estimates with likely high standard errors.
viii  Although the average disinvestment of the newest 
operations is 1 percent while that of new ones is 2%, this difference is not statistically significant 
as Table 1, which contains the summary statistics results, shows.  11 
 
The cash flow variable is measured by the percentage of profits (revenue minus costs) 
kept in liquid assets. Table 1 shows only few statistically significant differences between the two 
groups. We asked whether the liquidity farmers kept has increased after the crisis and use this 
dummy to explore if there is a possible effect on investment. We do not find statistically 
significant difference across the two groups with only 22 percent in each group reporting they 
kept high levels of liquidity after the crisis.  
Opportunity cost of capital is measured by two dummy variables - one that takes the 
value of one if operations’ ROA has increased in the 2008-2010 period and zero otherwise, and 
one dummy that takes the value of one if ROA has decreased during the period and zero 
otherwise. The base dummy variable is the one with no change in ROA.
ix Table 1 shows that 
increase in ROA was twice higher (10 %) among the newest operators than among the new 
operations (5 %) and this difference is statistically significant, although at the 10 % level.  
Among the control variables, we find few statistically significant differences across the 
groups. The newest farmers have fewer years of previous experience in farming (8.5 versus13.5) 
and higher proportion of their income coming from farming (17% versus 9%). Compared to the 
group of new operators, larger proportion of operators from the newest group have a Masters 
Degree or higher (16% versus 9%), fewer have sales from livestock production (51% versus 
62%) and fewer are black (7% versus 13%).  Fewer of the newest operators inherited it (14 % 
versus 24% ) and more purchased it (19% versus 12%). Most interestingly, while only 5% of the 
sample of operators in the new group had beginning assets of $250,000 or more, 29 % of the 
newest operations fall within this group. It is possible that many of the newest entrants in 
farming bought land to diversify their assets in unstable financial markets. However, since much 12 
 
higher percentage of this group’s income comes from farming, it is possible that the high returns 
to farming in the past few years had attracted new entrants.  
Summary statistics for the variables in the credit offer equation are also presented in 
Table 1.  There is a statistically significant difference between credit applications by the new and 
by the newest farmers (25% vs. 38%, respectively).
x To evaluate how collateral requirements 
affected access to loans, we asked farmers if collateral requirements were an obstacle to 
obtaining loans. The answer choices were “no obstacle” which we use as a base, while the 
obstacles were classified as minor, moderate, and major. We find statistically significant 
difference between the two groups only in the moderate category: 27% vs. 17% for the newest 
and the new farmers, respectively.  
 
4. Results and Discussion  
Liquidity constrains 
Table 2 presents the results from the regression of investment sensitivity to cash flow and 
investment opportunity. It contains 3 models with three different samples, the first with operators 
who started any part of their operations after 2005 (the newest group), the second with those who 
started between 2000 and 2005(new), and the last regression uses all observations. The overall fit 
of these models is acceptable explaining from a quarter to a third of the variation in the data.  
The results indicate that, as expected, investment opportunity affects investment by new 
farming operations in all specifications. Compared to farmers with a flat ROA, investment in 
operations with increasing ROA is higher by 12 percent and that in operations with decreasing 
ROA is lower by 6 percent. These results are the same for both groups of farmers.   13 
 
We find that investment in the group of newest operators depends on internal cash flows 
(liquidity) with 10 percent higher cash flows associated with about one percent higher 
investment. This relationship does not hold for the subsample of farmers who started their 
operation before 2005 which is consistent with Bierlen & Featherstone (1998) who found 
liquidity constraints in only youngest operators as well as with the literature on liquidity 
constraints in general (Carriera and Silva 2010).  However, the dummy capturing the change in 
liquidity (Extra Liquidity) kept by operators since 2008 is not statistically significant in any of 
the specifications. We interpret the results to indicate that while the new farmers experience 
liquidity constraints, these constraints were not affected by the 2008 crisis.  
Few other variables are statistically significant in the OLS model. In the group of newest 
operations, female operators had 7 % less investment than male operators. This result, combined 
with the relatively high age of operators and anecdotal evidence suggests that the sample 
contains widows receiving an inheritance and disinvesting from farming. In the same sub-
sample, operators in poultry have higher investment compared to operators in livestock with one 
percent higher income from poultry associated with 8 % higher investment.  Off farm work by 
the operator or the spouse and the percentage of income from farming are not associated with 
higher level of investment. We also do not find that experience in farming or in other business, 
operator age, education level, or race are associated with differences in on-farm investment, 
contrary to findings for off-farm investment by farmers (Mishra et al., 2001).  
Since land and its acquisition is important in farming, and we do not have data on 
operators’ land ownership, to ameliorate possible measurement issues in the change in  the 
investment variable, we include the level of farm assets at the begging of the operation and 
county level land prices for 2007. We find that 100 dollars higher land values are associated with 14 
 
about 3.8 percent disinvestment in farming and this variable is statistically significant only in the 
first specification for the newest operations. These results may suggest that relatively expensive 
land promotes leasing, or that it forces disinvestment in other capital assets.  
In terms of the size of the beginning assets, we find differences in association with 
investment only for the first model specifications and it indicates that farmers with larger 
beginning assets were much more likely to disinvest from farming compared to those in the 
smallest $5,000 or less beginning assets class
1.  
 
4.2 Access to credit 
Since financing constraints in new operators exist as our results suggest, we turn to the credit 
offer equation to determine what factors affected operators’ access to credit. The results with the 
marginal impact coefficients are shown in Table 3. Two specifications are estimated – one with 
the subsample of operators who started since 2005 and one for all operators who started since 
2000.  We first test for self-selection out of the credit market by testing if a heckman probit 
model is appropriate. The Wald test for independence of the two equations is rejected at the 1 
percent level in both specifications confirming the presence of self-selection.  
The results suggest that, for the overall sample of new farmers, those who thought they 
would not be awarded credit were 20 % less likely to apply than farmers who though that they 
could get credit from banks and other financial institutions. The newest operators were even less 
likely to apply as shown by the higher marginal impact coefficient of 27. Results further suggest 
that lending to farmers remains collateral driven. Farmers who thought collateral was a minor 
obstacle were 18 % less likely to apply (14 for the newest group) and those who thought 
collateral is a major obstacle were 27% (or 18 % for the newest group) less likely to apply for 
                                                            
1 To fit the table on one page, these results are not explicitly presented.   15 
 
loans. The group of the newest farmers seems less likely to apply if they feel they do not have 
access to loans from FCS or commercial banks but, compared to all farmers, are less averse to 
applying if collateral is a problem. Together, these results support the idea that new farmers and 
their lenders are less interested in the return to assets where collateral plays major role consistent 
and perhaps more interested in the return to management, consistent with the literature.   
We further find that average land prices do not affect the probability of loan application.  
Farmers running new operations were more likely to apply for loan. One additional year in 
business is associated with 0.6% and 6% lower probability of applying for credit for the new and 
newest operations, respectively. 
The results from the impact of income diversification show that one percent increase in 
income from farming is associated with 0.5 % increase in probability of applying for a loan. 
Farmers with off farm jobs were 13.7 % more likely to apply for loans than farmers who did not 
work off the farm suggesting that income diversification might have affected farmers’ 
confidence to seek loans. We further find that a 10 point increase in income from livestock 
production is associated with one percent higher probability to apply for loans and one percent 
higher probability of being denied a loan. The latter is a small magnitude but it is consistent with 
the resent problems in the market for protein production (Elinger, 2011).  
After controlling for the self-selection out of the credit market, we find that operators 
who considered collateral a moderate obstacle to getting credit were 6% more likely to have been 
denied loans while this coefficient is almost doubled to 11% for the group of newest operations. 
Compared to operators who did not consider collateral a problem, those who considered it a 
major problem were 16.3 % more likely to be denied credit, and this coefficient is 20.5% in the 
group of the newest operations.  16 
 
The dummy for growth is statistically significant and loan applicants whose operations 
grew were 10 to 15% more likely to have been approved for loans compared to those who did 
not experience growth, suggesting that agricultural lenders consider factors other than collateral. 
This finding may give support to the idea that lenders are increasingly focusing on cash flow 
rather than collateral based lending (Klinefelter and Penson, 2005).  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we set out to establish how the financial crisis on 2008 has affected farmers’ credit 
constraints and who were the farmers able to secure loans for their operation. We focus on the 
most vulnerable farmers – those with new operation or any part of their operating started in the 
past 10 years. Survey data from over 300 farmers from Alabama are used to estimate investment 
equation linking investment to investment opportunity and cash flow. Significant cash flow 
variable is interpreted as an indicator that internal and external funds are not perfect substitutes 
and evidence of credit (liquidity) constraints since investment depends on internally generated 
funds.  
In this context, we test for a link between investment and farmers keeping larger liquidity 
post 2008 as evidence of worsened credit constraints but we do not find evidence that the crisis 
has worsened the credit constraints of new operations in Alabama. We further find financing 
constraints only for the group of operators who started any part of their operating since 2005 
with 10% increase in cash flow associated with about 1% increase in investment. We did not find 
financing constraints for the group of operations that started/expanded between 2000 and 2004, 
consistent with previous findings about agricultural producers in Kansas (Bierlen and 
Featherstone 1998).  17 
 
  Exploring what factors affected agricultural lenders decisions to fund or not agricultural 
producers, we found that collateral remains the main obstacle to obtaining loans. We also found 
that farmers’ cash flow and profitability were also considered and were more important to the 
newest operations. Since our survey results also show that most new farmers use multiple 







Table 2. Investment Determinants, OLS 
  Newest    New  All  
Constant  17.10* -16.56  11.44 
  (10.15) (18.17)  (7.783) 
Cash Flow   0.111** 0.0112  0.0634* 
  (0.048) (0.0615)  (0.035) 
Extra liquidity   2.812 1.656  1.563 
  (2.665) (5.333)  (2.097) 
ROA Increase   11.46*** 12.08*  9.391*** 
  (3.460) (6.500)  (2.889) 
ROA Decrease   -5.782** -6.080*  -5.825*** 
  (2.448) (3.474)  (1.901) 
Female   -7.232** -5.117  -7.622*** 
  (3.541) (5.966)  (2.834) 
Exp in Farming   -0.0868 0.185  0.0117 
  (0.0797) (0.147)  (0.0671) 
Exp in Business   -0.0545 0.0931  0.00575 
  (0.0807) (0.119)  (0.0621) 
Income from Farming   -0.0544 0.0587  -0.0313 
  (0.0602) (0.0879)  (0.0473) 
Off farm work   -1.211 4.076  -0.341 
  (2.845) (4.505)  (2.215) 
Off farm work by spouse   0.916 -0.273  1.436 
  (2.409) (3.661)  (1.786) 
Operator age   -0.088 0.105  -0.0361 
  (0.115) (0.173)  (0.0854) 
Farm age   1.654 -0.0807  0.00686 
  (1.287) (0.165)  (0.118) 
Row crops  0.089 -0.058  0.0512 
  (0.061) (0.045)  (0.0435) 
Land value   -0.004** 0.004  -0.00136 
  (0.002) (0.003)  (0.00133) 
Inherited  -7.208** -5.388  -5.053** 
  (3.057) (3.635)  (2.087) 
Purchased  -2.023 -3.418  -2.796 
  (2.752) (6.787)  (2.579) 
Dummies      
Operations type (%sales 
from operation) 
Yes Yes Yes 
Education  Yes Yes Yes 
Beginning Assets Size  Yes Yes Yes 
     
Observations  201 104  305 
R-squared  0.357 0.335  0.251 
Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 19 
 
Table 3 Probit Heckman for receiving loan. Marginal effects for new and newest samples 
 
  (2) (4) (1) (3) 
VARIABLES  (Newest)   New   (Newest)   New  
      
No access to loans from Farm 
Credit Services  
0.059 0.076     
  (0.079) (0.066)     
No access to loans from banks & 
financial institutions  
-0.266* -0.201*     
  (0.141) (0.117)     




0.139* 0.175** -0.020  -0.024 
  (0.083) (0.069) (0.054) (0.044) 
  Collateral is a moderate obstacle 
to obtaining credit 
a
  
0.106 0.098  -0.112*  -0.061* 
  (0.079) (0.066) (0.062) (0.035) 




0.181* 0.267**  -0.205***  -0.163*** 
  (0.115) (0.091) (0.060) (0.073) 




  (0.048) (0.040) (0.046) (0.031) 
Dummy growth   -0.005 -0.035  0.1490**  0.101** 
  (0.007) (0.054) (0.058) (0.042) 
Farm Age   -0.064** -0.006*  0.034  0.0049 
  (0.028) (0.003) (0.022)  (0.0036) 
Income from farming   0.005*** 0.005*** -0.00066  -0.001 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.0001)  (0.001) 
Livestock production (% of farm 
income)  
0.002* 0.001**  -0.0014**  -0.001** 
  (0.001) (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.001) 
Exp in Farming   0.002 -0.00001  0.0008  0.001 
  (0.002) (0.0019)  (0.0015) (0.001) 
Off farm work   0.137* 0.136**  0.011  0.029 
  (0.071) (0.061) (0.045) (0.029) 
Observations  208  301 82 106 
Wald Chi2 (10)   40.14    
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i This approach has been modified to account for the impact of working capital and other issues.  Advantages and 
disadvantages of the approach are also discussed in Hubbard, 1998. 
ii Advantages and disadvantages of this approach are discussed in Hubbard, 1998 and empirical findings and 
specification issues are discussed in Carrier and Silva, 2010, recent theoretical work is in Clearly et al 2007.  
iii Change in cap ital assets rather than the more typical investment level scaled by capital stock is the dependent 
variable because it was not possible to ask farmers what was the value of their investment and their capital (or we 
would not have had sufficient number of returned surveys to conduct this analysis). For Alabama for example, there 
are 149 observations from farms in the 2009 ARMS data and only 7 have started any part of their operation since 
2005.  
iv There are several specifications for the investment opportunity such as the expected value of future profits and 
discounted value of income from 1 extra $ investment. In large firms, this is typically the average q which, under 
certain conditions (Hayashi 1982)  serves as a proxy for marginal q, or by the fundamental q which is measured in 
various ways (see Bierlen and Featherstone (1998) for application to agricultural producers). In small firms/farms, a 
measure of investment opportunity can be employment growth, sales growth, or profitability (e.g., Carreira and 
Silva 2010). 
v This model is estimated with heckprobit in Stata  
vi Such data are not available though alternative sources – e.g in the 2009 ARMS data there are only 6 observations 
from Alabama that correspond to the group of our newest farmers.   
 
vii  The Census question was "In what year did the operator begin to operate any part of this operation?" The 
population was identified as all farmers who entered 2005 or latter; imputed records were excluded and only the first 
operator from the operation cell (k0930) was used (operators 2 or 3 were ignored); inactive records were removed. 
Only operators with total value of products sold, who met the minimum threshold of $1,500 were part of the net 
population , which consisted of  1,639.   
viii It is possible that some Alabama farmers leased rather than bought land, but we were unable to measure use of 
leasing by operators. 
ix Thijssen (1996) shows that when investment and financing decisions are independent, capital investment decisions 
are consistent with static expectations, suggesting that a simple measure for investment opportunity is appropriate.  
x These results are consistent with the latest evidence on new small businesses presented at Atlanta Fed Reserve 
Conference on Small Businesses and Entrepreneurship, November 9-10 2011. 